How valid is the claim that in 1914 states went to war due to fear rather then motives of gain?

How valid is the claim that in 1914 landed estate of matters went to meshingfare due to charge quite an thusly motives of gain?Austria?s quarrel, Ger numerous?s strugglefareOne of the theories near the outbreak of the First World fight is that nations went to struggle non to needs gain something merely importantly because of fear which caused by m both a nonher(prenominal) distinct accompanimentors. nuclear number 63 before the war asshole be compared to a round-about with the countries involved, Germany being the central pole, locomote up and thus causing the nations into uncontrollable chaos resulting in them s for constantlyance off. The basis of the on the wholeiance systems endureed take a leaking as early as 1871. France and Russia had been confirmative of each different ever since France lent Russia money to start industrialization during the reign of horse parsley II. The bond between these cardinal great superpowers was strengthened by their s hared enemies, the underlying Powers. Their reasons to find out on such in alliance, however, were in truth different. After the Franco-Prussian war of 1871, in which France lost Alsace and Lorraine, both rich in coal and atomic soma 26 reserves to the Prussians, at that place was a bitter, revengeful feeling in France-Revanchism. The french believed it was their right to fight a victorious war against Germany and retrieve Alsace and Lorraine. Germany was aware of this and von von Bismarck demanded 5 billion francs as war reparations, believing that this penalization exit cripple France for years. Bismarck was, however, no economist, and Germany was to fear France ever since 1873, when last francs were handed over to Germany. ?German acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine meant that thither must be a war between Germany and France? Karl MarxAt the Algeciras congregation in Spain, al some all great powers and other nations heady to support the French rights in Morocco dur ing the First Moroccan crisis, s directding! Germany without any likely consort except for Austria-Hungary. This ?conspiracy? against Germany led to her fear of encirclement and their alliance, and then, was non because of strong mutual sympathy or the Gross Deutschland ideal, provided simply due to this fear of encirclement- Austria-Hungary was the on the whole option. As Germany was comparatively young, full of energy, ambitions, and primarily a respect- demanding country, its main potential gain- if a war was to break out- would be increase its colonial empire. This is apprehensible when we realize that in the 19th carbon power, respect and an empire were tightly tied together. ?From now nobody will go across in the world without Germany and its Kaiser? Wilhelm IIGermany already had some colonies, but this number was relatively small and sure as shooting not heavy(p) generous to satisfy its aspirations. just even for these colonies a naval forces was necessary. on that pointfore, chthonic Admiral Tirpit z, the great improvement of the German navy began with the remnant of protecting their existent and potential colonies. However, it was translucent that the main tendency is to tease Britain. This turned out to knead well; Britain had everlastingly been dependant on its navy as it was the best and only demeanor of keeping all likely threats away from the islands. It could not afford to let Germany develop its navy so drastically, oddly because of Germany?s strategic position by the North ocean where Britain had her weakest point. This accumulated with Kaiser?s arrogance (especially Realpolitik- accomplishes the cultivation no outcome how- murders, blackmail?) and clumsy politics (The effortless Telegraph affair) resulting in a strongly anti-German felling in Britain. dismiss for her colonial ambitions, some other goal that would come out of a war for Germany was what Von Moltke called ?an immediate, rub war against France and Russia?, since Russia was planning on inc reasing her army from 1.5 to 2.0 million. Except for ! the threat of German navy, Britain was not affected by the actions on the continent too untold- and it did not want to get affected. It remained in ?Splendid isolationism? as Britain?s attitude towards continental Europe was described by passkey Salisbury. ?English policy is to cast lazily downstream, occasionally move out a diplomatic boathook to avoid collisions.? Lord Salisbury. As Britain did not have much to gain from a war with the of import powers, it was not clear up until the last moments whether it will stick to its promise and join the war on the French side. In the end, however, the British found something useful in the war. There were many protests in Britain as state-controlled parties were emerging. Ireland also cherished its own rule and eldest suffragettes appeared. A short, successful war would have been a good way of moving the way of the society on something else. The obvious potential gain was destroying German navy and causing a waive to its grow th. This was, on the other hand, too risky, as this could inflict big damage to the British navy. Slavs looked up to Russia as the mother of all Slavs (this is called Panslavism). The goal of most Slavic nationalists, liberals and intellectuals at the time was to invent a state in which all Slavs would live together. This very much touch on Austria-Hungary, Germany?s main ally, as many Slavic nations were include in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It also had its own ambitions in the Balkans (annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908). Austria was apprehensive as Serbia was growing stronger and stronger, wanting to form a state similar to later Yugoslavia. Russia supported this Serbian struggle. With Austria-Hungary and her support of the Central powers on one side and Russia with French, and maybe even British support on the other, the Balkans formed a better counterpoint site. ?We have to crush Serbia like a viper? Austrian commander in chief. Austria-Hungary and Germany thus h ad reasons for their slight paranoia. As and addition! to this served the mountain range of barbaric hordes from the steppes of Asia, charging the civilized central Europe. This visceral fear and the detail that with the population of 166 million people, Russia had often untrammelled human power reserves (and would be therefore practically undefeatable if there were an tolerable amount of equipment) made Russia itself the biggest fear of the Central Powers, as proven by the Schlieffen plan, which stated that it was necessary to focus on Russia after(prenominal) quickly defeating France. ?We cannot compete with the Russian masses.? Von MoltkeA perfect example of the fact that nations went to war mostly because of fear and not gain is first war declaration. This was caused by the Russian mobilization, which was a reaction to German aggression towards Prussia. Russia, however, was for now not expiry to precede any further then a mobilization. But fear and astonishment led the Germans into the certainty that Russia is about to att ack. German mobilization was then the obvious next step, and The Great War was about to begin. States therefore did go to war because of fear of different issues. But it must be remembered that without any perspective of profit, there would not be anything to fear in the first place. For example, France?s gain would be Germany?s loss and thus reasons for war for all countries include both gain and fear aspects. It is, however, obvious that the many miscalculations of mainly, but not only, the German government caused fearsome confusion and distrust about who is actually the one in control, causing this to result in the dominance of fear reasons. Bibliography: my history teacher If you want to get a full essay, bless it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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